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A “SECOND-CLASS RIGHT” FOR
“SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS”
Benjamin A. Rice*
ABSTRACT
In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court countenanced against
treating the Second Amendment as a “second-class right.” Against this
admonition, congressional defunding of federal restorative programs has
rendered the amendment a second-class right for an ever-increasing and muchmaligned group of people: those who have been adjudicated as mentally ill. In
a majority of states, those who have been involuntarily committed at any point
in their lives to a mental health institution lose the right to bear arms for life.
Taking guns out of the hands of those who have enjoyed decades of good mental
health after a brief stint of treatment stigmatizes all who have battled mental
illness and unfairly treats them as “second-class citizens,” undeserving of their
constitutionally guaranteed rights.
This Comment seeks to show that even in the ever-evolving jurisprudence of
the Second Amendment, the lifetime ban currently imposed on this group fails
under all forms of constitutional analysis. This Comment updates current
scholarship by addressing two as-of-yet undiscussed circuit court cases and
looking to the ascendent “historical approach” to Second Amendment
challenges, in which courts look to the text, history, and tradition of the right to
determine constitutionality. Then, it looks to tiered scrutiny, proposing that
courts examine challenges to the current effective ban under the lens of strict
scrutiny and disproving the oft-cited government interests.
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Library for their unending help in research, and the editors in the SMU Law Review Forum for
their edits. All the views, and any errors, expressed herein are my own.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Until immigrating to the United States at age two, Duy T. Mai lived in a Thai
refugee camp.1 Since then, he has lived the quintessential American success
story: Mai graduated from a prestigious west coast university with a 3.7 GPA in
microbiology, and he later completed post-graduate studies on cancer research,
receiving a graduate degree in microbiology.2 After obtaining his second degree,
Mai moved to the state of Washington to research virology at a number of
1. Mai v. United States (Mai II), 974 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J.,
dissenting) (denying rehearing en banc).
2. Id.
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prestigious research centers throughout the state.3 In his home life, Mai is a
father of two, he remains close to his extended family, and he regularly
volunteers near his home.4
But like more than seventeen million Americans,5 Mai has a history of
depression. In 1999, at age seventeen, Mai was involuntarily committed to a
mental health hospital for treatment, for which a state court adjudicated him as
mentally ill and dangerous.6 Mai’s brief brush with depression thankfully
passed. The following year, his commitment ended, and he has not needed
treatment since.7 According to Mai, he has since completely recovered and no
longer takes medication to control his previous condition.8 In support of his
claim, it should be noted that Mai’s academic successes occurred after his
commitment.9 Despite his post-commitment successes, his onetime brush with
depression has irreversibly changed his legal status: his involuntary commitment
means that both Washington10 and federal11 law bar him from legally purchasing
a firearm.
Undeterred, in 2014 Mai started the tortuous process of recouping his Second
Amendment rights and reestablishing his name in the eyes of the law. In that
year, he petitioned a Washington state court to restore his firearm rights to permit
him to purchase a firearm for self-defense.12 To augment his petition, Mai
gathered supportive declarations from medical and psychological experts
testifying to his condition.13 The state court granted his petition under state law,14
stating plainly that “[Mai] no longer presents a substantial danger to himself, or
the public.”15 Mai’s rights, at least under state law, were restored.
His rights under federal law have been another story altogether. After the
restoration of his state rights, Mai attempted to pass a required background check
to purchase a firearm but later received a phone call from the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) notifying him that the restoration of
his state rights did not nullify his ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), which
prohibits possession of firearms by those who have been involuntarily
committed to a mental institution.16 The current federal statutory scheme permits
states to opt in to a program in which their state reviewing bodies may lift the
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Major
Depression,
NAT’L
INST.
OF
MENTAL
HEALTH,
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/major-depression.shtml
[https://perma.cc/4KUFB6AN].
6. Mai v. United States (Mai I), 952 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2020).
7. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 7, Mai I, 952 F.3d 1106 (No. 18-36071), 2019 WL 1580778,
at *7.
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id. at 7.
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.047 (2020).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
12. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 7, at 8.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Mai v. United States (Mai I), 952 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2020).
16. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 7, at 9.
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federal ban on their citizens.17 But Washington, like the majority of states in
2020, has not elected to opt in to the program.18 Effectively, because of a short,
involuntary commitment more than twenty years ago, Mai can never purchase a
firearm under federal law. The law stands on the shaky premise that once
mentally ill, always mentally ill, and stigmatizes those like Mai who have
overcome their bouts with depression.
Unable to take advantage of restorative programs, Mai brought a Second
Amendment suit in federal court to reestablish his rights,19 but he has lost in each
of his cases. His legal struggles highlight two areas for concern in modern
Second Amendment jurisprudence. First, the court’s analysis of his challenge to
§ 922(g)(4) differs greatly from two factually similar cases outside of the Ninth
Circuit where Mai brought his challenge, highlighting the bare unpredictability
of modern Second Amendment jurisprudence.20 Second, and more narrowly, the
effective lifetime ban on firearm possession by those involuntary committed for
old and nonextant mental health concerns is unconstitutional under any of the
current competing Second Amendment analyses.
In Part II, this Comment will outline current Second Amendment
jurisprudence. Part III will address Mai’s case and two other as-applied
challenges to § 922(g)(4) that have reached the federal courts of appeals, all of
which have resulted in different holdings. Part IV will show that the statute, as
it stands, fails under the ascendent historical approach advanced by originalist
judges since then-Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in Heller v. District of Columbia,
and Part V will show the same under the widely used tiered scrutiny approach.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF SECOND AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
The Second Amendment provides that, “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.”21 The amendment is no model for clarity—one
Second Amendment scholar noted that “[i]t’s almost as if James Madison, the
author of the amendment, had just discovered this wonderful new thing, the
comma, and wanted to put it in there as many times as possible.”22 For most part
of its history, clauses and commas befuddled anyone trying to make sense of the
amendment, and only a handful of Supreme Court cases shed any light on the
one-sentence amendment.

17. See infra Part II.D.1.
18. NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009-2020, BUREAU OF
JUST.
STAT.,
https://bjs.ojp.gov/programs/nics-improvement-amendments-act/stateprofiles?tid=491&ty=tp#5is2kq [https://perma.cc/YLB9-43EM] (recording only twenty-two states
taking part in the program in 2020); see also infra Part II.D.
19. Mai v. United States, No. C17-0561, 2018 WL 784582, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 8, 2018).
20. See infra Parts III.A–III.B (discussing the two cases).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
22. Radiolab Presents: More Perfect – The Gun Show, RADIOLAB, at 02:37 (Feb. 23, 2018),
https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/articles/radiolab-presents-more-perfect-gun-show
[https://perma.cc/CR9J-489E].
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A. MILLER TO HELLER
Not until the 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller did the Supreme
Court attempt to delineate the amendment’s scope. Until Heller, debate raged
over whether the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and
bear arms or, instead, a collective right protecting firearm use only in connection
with militia service.23 In Heller, Justice Scalia resolved the individual- or
collective-rights debate in favor of the former interpretation.24 Writing for the
five-justice majority, Justice Scalia penned a well-researched originalist analysis
of the Second Amendment, looking to dictionary definitions contemporary to
the Constitution’s ratification,25 post-English Restoration militia laws,26 and late
eighteenth-century state constitutions27 to conclude that the right conferred was,
indeed, an individual one.28 To Justice Scalia, the amendment’s prefatory
clause—providing that “[a] well regulated Militia being necessary to the security
of a Free State”—serves only to announce the purpose for which the right to
keep and bear arms was originally codified, and not to limit the operative clause
to a collective right protecting only those serving in the militia.29 Next,
highlighting the importance of self-defense weapons in the history of the Second
Amendment,30 the majority held that the District of Columbia’s blanket ban on
handgun possession, including those held in the home for self-defense, was
constitutionally forbidden.31 The holding failed to settle the Second Amendment
debate.
For all that Justice Scalia did to clarify the rights debate, he left open the
question of how to address future Second Amendment challenges. Answers to
whether Justice Scalia prescribed a constitutional analysis for future challenges
in his opinion are up-for-debate at best. Questions on the proper analysis are
further complicated by the debate over how much deference to give Heller’s
“presumptively lawful” bans.32 In noting the limits of the Second Amendment
right at the end of the opinion, Justice Scalia gave his blessing to bans on
possession by the mentally ill by giving it the label of presumptively lawful, but
the claim went unsupported.33 In effect, the unsubstantiated sentence excuses

23. See generally Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court
Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961, 972–
76 (1996) (discussing pre-Heller debate of the scope of the right).
24. District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 592–95 (2008).
25. Justice Scalia used Samuel Johnson’s eighteenth-century dictionary to define both “arms”
and “keep.” Id. at 581–82 (quoting 1 DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 106, 1095 (4th ed.
1773) (reprt. 1978)).
26. Id. at 593–95.
27. Id. at 600–03.
28. Id. at 595.
29. Id. at 595, 599.
30. Id. at 624–25 (quoting State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 98 (Or. 1980)) (“In the colonial and
revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of
person and home were one and the same.”).
31. Id. at 635.
32. Id. at 626–27, 627 n.26.
33. See id. (listing other presumptively lawful prohibitions in addition to the ban on
possession by formerly mentally ill individuals, including bans on the possession of “dangerous
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§ 922(g)(4)’s ban. Certainly, those who are currently mentally ill might be
required to face some hurdles in firearm possession, but did Justice Scalia give
a nod to lifetime bans based on little more than a period of mental illness in a
person’s youth? Such a position is unlikely, given that the late justice’s opinion
amounts to a sixty-three-page screed against a complete handgun ban. But the
lack of a clearly defined analysis coupled with unsubstantiated dicta leaves a
tangle of unsettled questions on Second Amendment doctrine, especially as it
relates to the presumptively lawful categorical bans.
The confusion has played out in the “presumptively lawful” ban under §
922(g)(4). In fact, many post-Heller challenges to § 922(g)(4), though
containing largely identical facts, have seen different results.34 Factoring in
dissenting and concurring opinions, the list of hypothesized ways to resolve
these as-applied challenges proves mind-numbingly complex and leaves even
judges confused.35 To be sure, the Court has granted certiorari to a number of
Second Amendment cases post-Heller, but none have resolved the debate
surrounding the proper analysis,36 and lower courts have had to make sense of
Heller on their own.
B. TIERED SCRUTINY OR “TEXT, HISTORY, AND TRADITION”?
“In Heller’s wake, two opposing points of view have emerged regarding [the]
proper” analysis for Second Amendment challenges.37 All circuits have filled
the gap by opting for a two-tiered analysis first pioneered by the Third Circuit
in United States v. Marzzarella.38 Under this approach, courts first ask what level
of scrutiny applies based on whether the statute burdens the Second
Amendment’s core of lawful self-defense39 and then analyze the statute under
and unusual” weapons, possession by felons, and the carrying of weapons in certain sensitive
places); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (reaffirming the list of
presumptively lawful regulatory measures and explicitly extending the Second Amendment to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
34. E.g., Mai v. United States (Mai I), 952 F.3d 1106, 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding
that § 922(g)(4) withstands intermediate scrutiny as applied to the plaintiff); Beers v. Att’y Gen.
United States, 927 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Beers
v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (2020) (mem.) (disposing of the challenge and upholding the statute under
the first step of tiered scrutiny); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler II), 837 F.3d 678,
699 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (applying intermediate scrutiny, finding that the plaintiff has a viable
claim, and remanding to the district court).
35. In the en banc opinion of Tyler, Judge Gibbons writes that “as [she] read[s] the
opinions . . . at least twelve of [them] agree that intermediate scrutiny should be applied.” Tyler II,
837 F.3d at 699 (emphasis added).
36. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 749–753; Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411, 411–12
(2016) (per curiam) (discussing the application of Heller to stun guns).
37. Lindsay Colvin, History, Heller, and High-Capacity Magazines: What Is the Proper
Standard of Review for Second Amendment Challenges?, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1043
(2014).
38. 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). See generally Benjamin A. Ellis, Note, “Time Enough”
for Scrutiny: The Second Amendment, Mental Health, and the Case for Intermediate Scrutiny, 25
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1325, 1343–47 (2017) (discussing in depth the circuit courts’
precedents).
39. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89–90. The Court in Heller stated that “[M]ost [Americans]
undoubtedly thought [the Second Amendment] even more important for self-defense and hunting,”
and the interest in self-defense “was the central component of the right itself.” District of Columbia

COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2021]

Second-Class Right for Second-Class Citizens

187

the requisite scrutiny.40 Despite the lack of direction in Heller, the court in
Marzzarella read the landmark case to suggest such a tiered approach.41 Though
it enjoys dubious approval in Heller, the approach presents a familiar analysis to
judges used to analyzing tiered scrutiny in other constitutional claims.
C. “TEXT, HISTORY, AND TRADITION”: THE HISTORICAL APPROACH
By contrast, the historical approach resolves Second Amendment challenges
by combing historical sources and striking down statutes for which no analogy
can be found.42 The approach has not seen widespread approval in majority
opinions, but a growing number of originalist judges have advocated its
approach in dissents or concurrences, such that it may see approval over tiered
scrutiny in the future. Advocates of the historical approach make much of Justice
Scalia’s keen eye to the history of the Second Amendment in Heller when
determining the scope of the right. They further maintain that Justice Scalia’s
dive into the history of the amendment amounts to an analysis for lower courts
to emulate in future cases that leaves no room for interest balancing.43
In 2011, then-Judge Kavanaugh on the D.C. Circuit took up the flag for the
historical approach and argued for its adoption in his dissenting opinion in Heller
II.44 His dissent is frequently seen as the genesis of the revolt against tiered
scrutiny.
Three years after Heller, Heller II concerned the District of Columbia’s
renewed attempt to regulate firearm possession. Following the first Heller case,
the D.C. Council passed a slew of regulations that required firearm registration45
and prohibited broadly defined categories of assault weapons46 and largecapacity magazines.47 Although the registration requirements provided the
avenue to gun ownership that Heller required, they created a protracted process
for ownership that included, among other requirements, sufficient eyesight,48 a
knowledge of local firearm laws,49 fingerprinting,50 and continued background
checks.51 The assault-weapons ban was sweeping, covering certain semiautomatic rifles, pistols, shotguns, and all semi-automatic firearms that included
pistol grips or thumbhole stocks.52 The regulations, at least ostensibly, complied

v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
40. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89.
41. Id.
42. Mai v. United States (Mai II), 974 F.3d 1082, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J.,
dissenting).
43. Id. at 1086 (Bumatay, J., dissenting).
44. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1270–71 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
45. D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01(a) (2015).
46. § 7-2502.02(a)(6).
47. § 7-2506.01(b) (defining “large capacity” as holding more than ten rounds).
48. § 7-2502.03(a)(11).
49. § 7-2502.03(a)(10).
50. § 7-2502.04(a).
51. § 7-2502.07(d) (repealed 2012) (requiring background checks every six years).
52. § 7-2501.01(3A)(A).
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with Heller in that they provided Dick Heller and other D.C. residents an avenue
for legal ownership of firearms for the purpose of self-defense. Even so, Heller
and the co-plaintiffs in the case were each denied possession of certain weapons
after compliance with the application process, and they brought suit against the
regulations’ barriers to ownership and the outright ban on certain classes of
weapons.53
Dick Heller—often lionized by Second Amendment proponents for his
successes in his first challenge54—was unable to repeat his earlier Supreme
Court victory, losing at the D.C. Circuit on his Second Amendment arguments
against assault-weapon and high-capacity-magazine bans.55 Judge Douglas H.
Ginsburg looked to the freshly minted Heller opinion in support of the
contention that the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment right was not without
bounds.56 He then applied the widely accepted two-step analysis to the Second
Amendment issue, looking to Heller to aid in determining the requisite level of
scrutiny.57 Judge Ginsburg eventually settled on intermediate scrutiny but
remanded the case to the district court to develop a fuller record on the novel
requirements’ relation to government interests.58 The opinion was par for the
course for current Second Amendment cases: the majority looked to Heller, and
then it applied tiered scrutiny.
While Heller’s second attempt failed to overturn the laws at issue, then-Judge
Kavanaugh’s full-throated dissent has ensured that the case has a spot in the
canon of gun-rights cases. Judge Kavanaugh disagreed with both the result of
the case and the application of tiered scrutiny. To him, the proper route for
Second Amendment analyses lies in the “text, history, and tradition” of the
amendment and in appropriate historical analogues for novel weapons
regulations, rather than judicial “re-calibrat[ion]” of the scope of the right
through tiered scrutiny.59 Central to Judge Kavanaugh’s argument is that the
historical test, which he underhandedly calls “the Heller test,” is “more
determinate and ‘much less subjective’ because ‘it depends upon a body of
evidence susceptible of reasoned analysis rather than a variety of vague . . .
[p]rinciples whose combined conclusion can be found to point in any direction
the judges favor.’”60 To him, his approach precludes judicial subjectivity. Under
such an approach, Judge Kavanaugh would have held that the statutes at issue
were unconstitutional because they were neither longstanding nor sufficiently

53. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
54. Justin Wm. Moyer, ‘The Culture’s Changed’: Gun Rights Supporters Mark 10 Years
Since Landmark Ruling Toppled D.C. Gun Ban, WASH. POST (June 26, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/the-cultures-changed-gun-rights-supporters-mark10-years-since-landmark-ruling-toppled-dc-gun-ban/2018/06/26/02fdf738-7890-11e8-bda2f99f3863e603_story.html [https://perma.cc/TD6X-XM9J].
55. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1264.
56. Id. at 1252.
57. Id. at 1252–53.
58. Id. at 1253, 1258–60.
59. Id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 1274 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 804 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
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rooted in text, history, and tradition of the Second Amendment.61
D. SECTION 922(G)(4)’S EFFECTIVE LIFETIME BAN
Debate over the proper analysis has raged across Second Amendment
challenges, but especially so in challenges to § 922(g)(4). Congress passed this
and other gun-control statutes in 1968 in an effort to stem the number of highprofile shootings that had marked the decade. Just five days after Lee Harvey
Oswald assassinated President Kennedy in 1963 with a mail-order rifle, Senator
Thomas Dodd from Connecticut led the charge for gun control by introducing
legislation to restrict sales of firearms through the mails.62 Though the efforts of
the initial Dodd bill came to nothing, Senator Dodd continued to introduce
legislation at the request of President Johnson.63 Comprehensive legislation
finally saw widespread support in 1968 after two more high-profile killings: the
Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) passed the Senate the month after the slaying
of Martin Luther King, Jr. and passed the House the day after the assassination
of Robert F. Kennedy.64 Congress declared that the GCA’s purpose was “to
provide support to [f]ederal [and] [s]tate . . . law enforcement officials in their
fight against crime and violence.”65 To that end, the GCA expanded the
categories of congressionally defined groups proscribed from firearm
possession, including felons and the mentally ill.66
Including a ban on possession by the mentally ill, perhaps in some ways
precipitated by the violence of the mid-1960s, extended the list of prohibited
classes past pre-GCA regulations. Senator Dodd blamed violent television
programs, extremist organizations, and the ease with which Americans can
obtain firearms as contributing to a “sickness of violence.”67 Sickness, a byword
for mental illness, was thus squarely within the GCA’s sights. No doubt Senator
Dodd was thinking of “sick” assassins like Lee Harvey Oswald and James Earl
Ray in his remarks.
In order to hinder the sickness of violence, § 922(g)(4) provides that “[i]t shall
be unlawful for any person who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or
who has been committed to a mental institution” to possess or receive any
firearm.68 The ATF regulations expand on the statute, defining one as
“[a]djudicated as mental defective” if there has been a determination by a legal
body that “a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental
61. Id. at 1285.
62. Jon Michaud, The Birth of the Modern Gun Debate, NEW YORKER (Apr. 19, 2012),
https://www.newyorker.com/books/double-take/the-birth-of-the-modern-gun-debate
[https://perma.cc/3QLM-QQMP].
63. Laura Smith, UNIV. OF CONN. LIBRS., Thomas J. Dodd and the Gun Control Act of 1968,
CONN. HIST.ORG (Dec. 13, 2016), https://connecticuthistory.org/thomas-j-dodd-and-the-guncontrol-act-of-1968/ [https://perma.cc/4QPG-SZAG].
64. Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 133, 146–48 (1975).
65. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, § 101, 82 Stat. 1213, 1213 (1968).
66. Zimring, supra note 64, at 149.
67. 114 CONG. REC. S16649 (daily ed. June 11, 1968) (statement of Sen. Dodd).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
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illness, incompetency, condition, or disease” is a “danger to himself or others”
or “[l]acks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs.”69 The
term “[c]ommitted to a mental institution,” at issue in the Mai case, includes
involuntary commitments to mental institutions for mental defectiveness, mental
illness, or “other reasons, such as for drug use.”70
1.

The Relief Program

Of crucial importance to the statute’s unconstitutionality, the ban on firearm
possession by those who have been adjudicated mentally ill was never meant to
be permanent. The framers of the GCA had the foresight to provide an outlet for
those barred by § 922(g)(4) to reattain their Second Amendment rights through
application to the Attorney General.71 Such outlet, codified at 18 U.S.C. §
925(c), grants to the Attorney General the ability to grant “relief from the
disabilities imposed by Federal laws” after reviewing the circumstances of the
applicant’s record and deciding “that the applicant will not be likely to act in a
manner dangerous to public safety.”72 The Attorney General later delegated the
authority to review these claims to the director of the ATF.73 In 1992, however,
Congress defunded the program,74 and for fifteen years thereafter, all people like
Mai were left without an avenue to regain their Second Amendment rights.
In 2008, there was renewed hope for those like Mai wanting to restore their
rights: that year Congress punted the issue of adjudicating relief to the states. In
changes to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS)
scheme,75 Congress gave states the power to grant relief from § 922(g)(4)’s ban
if an authorized state body found that the individual would not pose a danger to
public safety.76 States that created relief-granting bodies in compliance with
Congress’s scheme became eligible for grant funding to assist in implementing
such bodies.77 The congressional punt has proven only somewhat successful.
The availability of grant funds has only attracted a handful of states: in 2020,
only twenty-two states received funding.78 In all other states, formerly
involuntarily committed persons are unable to regain their Second Amendment
rights via any federal or state statutory or administrative route. The only option
left for this class of individuals is to bring an as-applied Second Amendment
challenge to the statute, a costly and flawed solution. Some applicants that have
69. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2019).
70. Id.
71. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, § 102, 82 Stat. 1213, 1224–26 (1968) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 925). The original text provided for application to the Secretary of the
Treasury. Id.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
73. 28 C.F.R. § 0.130(a)(1) (2015).
74. See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L.
No. 102–393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1732 (1993).
75. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, § 105, 121 Stat.
2559, 2569–70 (2008).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 301, at 2571.
78. See NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009-2020, supra note
18.
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brought Second Amendment claims have indeed received a federal
reinstatement of rights. In a minority of cases, judges have interpreted
“involuntary commitment” under § 922(g)(4) narrowly to avoid the deprivation
of rights,79 and in others, judges have found the statute unconstitutional as
applied.80 Although promising, adjudication of these claims on an as-applied
basis is too costly for many potential plaintiffs, would clog federal dockets, and
on a more fundamental level, serves as an unwieldy vehicle through which
American citizens should be forced to rely to reinstate their rights.
III. RECENT AS-APPLIED CASES AGAINST SCHEME OF § 922(G)(4)
IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
These challenges to § 922(g)(4)’s effective lifetime ban have been met with
mixed results. As mentioned, the three factually similar post-Heller challenges
to § 922(g)(4) that have reached the federal circuit courts have reached markedly
different conclusions. This Part will discuss the three cases and their outcomes.
A. SIXTH CIRCUIT: TYLER V. HILLSDALE COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT
The Sixth Circuit was the first circuit post-Heller to wrestle with a Second
Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(4) in Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s
Department.81 The state of Michigan’s failure to implement a relief program
meant that Tyler was unable to purchase a firearm,82 but the district court
dismissed his suit for failure to state a claim under the Second Amendment.83 In
the panel decision on appeal, Judge Boggs disagreed with the lower court’s
analysis. He settled on tiered scrutiny in keeping with the circuit’s precedent on
Second Amendment challenges to categorical bans.84 Bound by the use of tiered
scrutiny, Judge Boggs was free to choose the level of scrutiny as a matter of first
impression for the circuit.85 Noting what he called “intermediate scrutiny’s
shaky foundation in Second Amendment law”86 and that the strongest argument
in its favor amounted to nothing more than its popularity among circuits in other
categorical bans,87 Judge Boggs opted to examine the as-applied challenge under

79. Franklin v. Sessions, 291 F. Supp. 3d 705, 723–24 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (avoiding the
“seriousness of these constitutional issues” with regards to a lack of review in Pennsylvania through
the canon of constitutional avoidance); United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2012)
(“[W]e now conclude that section 922 should not be read to encompass a temporary hospitalization
attended only by the ex parte procedures of section 3863.”).
80. Keyes v. Sessions, 282 F. Supp. 3d 858, 878 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (“Enforcement of the statute
against Keyes therefore violates his right to keep and bear arms—a right guaranteed to him by the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.”).
81. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler I), 775 F.3d 308, 311 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d
en banc, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016).
82. Id. at 313–15.
83. Tyler v. Holder, No. 1:12-CV-523, 2013 WL 356851, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013).
84. Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 317–18 (citing United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir.
2012)).
85. Id. at 311.
86. Id. at 330.
87. Id. at 324.
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strict scrutiny.88 He subsequently held that Tyler had stated a claim and
remanded to the district court.89
Judge Boggs’s opinion rankled his Sixth Circuit colleagues, who reviewed
the case en banc. The en banc panel agreed that reversing the district court was
proper, but it disagreed with Judge Boggs’s choice of strict scrutiny.90 In the first
step of tiered scrutiny—whether the statute burdened conduct protected by the
Second Amendment—the en banc panel rejected the government’s argument
that Heller’s presumptively lawful language meant that § 922(g)(4) was per se
constitutional.91 Instead, the court rightfully noted that the presumptively lawful
category rested on ambiguous historical support, and it found that previously
committed persons “are not categorically unprotected by the Second
Amendment.”92 Consequently, § 922(g)(4), at least as applied to Tyler, burdened
his Second Amendment right. Second, the en banc majority reasoned that risks
inherent in firearms distinguish Second Amendment claims from other rights
that use strict scrutiny,93 and it instead settled on the “near unanimous preference
for intermediate scrutiny.”94 Noting that Tyler had a “viable claim” under the
Second Amendment and citing an incomplete record, the court remanded the
case to the district court for resolution.95
In total, six concurrences and one dissent trade punches on the correct
analysis, highlighting the judicial confusion post-Heller.96 In the same vein as
Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent in Heller II, Judge Batchelder advocated for the
historical approach in concurrence because, to her, two-step analyses “fail[] to
give adequate attention to the Second Amendment’s original public meaning.”97
Regardless, the majority opinion’s evenhanded approach that held Tyler had
stated a claim in Tyler II provides the best approach of the three circuit-level
opinions to ensure that plaintiffs have at least some avenue for a restoration of
rights. Further, the opinion leaves little doubt as to the proper analysis for future
as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(4) within the Sixth Circuit: judges are to
employ a two-step analysis and use intermediate scrutiny.
B. THIRD CIRCUIT: BEERS V. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES
In the case of Beers v. Attorney General United States, the Third Circuit, like
the Sixth before it, looked to a two-step inquiry to resolve the as-applied
challenge to § 922(g)(4).98 The Third Circuit, though, employed a novel form of
88. Id. at 328.
89. Id. at 344.
90. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler II), 837 F.3d 678, 699 (6th Cir. 2016).
91. Id. at 688–90.
92. Id. at 690.
93. Id. at 691.
94. Id. at 692.
95. Id. at 699.
96. Id. at 699–721.
97. Id. at 702 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
98. Beers v. Att’y Gen. United States, 927 F.3d 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom. Beers v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (2020) (mem.) (granting certiorari and
remanding with instructions to dismiss the case as moot).
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the two-step inquiry tailored specifically to categorical bans that replaces the
first step of the inquiry with a two-part question. Under the Third Circuit’s
formulation, the challenger must (1) identify the traditional justifications for the
exclusion of his class from Second Amendment protections, and (2) present facts
about himself that distinguish him from persons of the historically barred class.99
This approach, the Binderup approach, explicitly invites challengers to present
their medical histories as testament to their reformed status and serves as an
ostensibly sympathetic route for the restoration of rights.
But the Third Circuit’s opinion was anything but plaintiff-friendly. In the first
step of the Binderup approach, the Third Circuit read the history of the rights of
the mentally ill to say something entirely different than did the Sixth Circuit
before it. Whereas the Sixth Circuit read history to stand for the proposition that
mental illness did not conclusively justify a lifetime ban,100 the court in Beers
concluded that the historical practice of disarming potentially dangerous persons
justified § 922(g)(4).101 The panel downplayed the novelty of bans on firearm
possession by the mentally ill by noting that similar laws would have been
unnecessary in the eighteenth century, when judicial officials were free “to lock
up . . . individuals with dangerous mental impairments” because they posed a
danger to the public.102 In such a system, the mentally ill would have been unable
to access firearms without the need for statutes.103 By analogy, the court
reasoned that “if taking away a [mentally ill person]’s liberty was permissible,
then . . . the lesser intrusion of taking his . . . firearms” should be no cause for
concern.104 The court then looked to whether Beers had sufficiently
distinguished himself from the historical group, decided that he had not, and
upheld the lower court’s rejection of his challenge.105
C. NINTH CIRCUIT: MAI V. UNITED STATES
The majority opinion from the Ninth Circuit’s iteration of an as-applied
challenge to § 922(g)(4) presents yet another different outcome from a largely
similar factual scenario. In reviewing Mai’s Second Amendment challenge to
the federal statute, the Ninth Circuit, like the two circuits before it, employed a
two-step analysis.106 Under the first step, Mai urged the Ninth Circuit to follow
Tyler II’s lead by finding that mental illness does not justify a lifetime ban and,
consequently, that the statute burdened his Second Amendment right.107 The
99. Id. at 155 (quoting Binderup v. Att’y Gen. United States, 836 F.3d 336, 346–47 (3d Cir.
2016)).
100. Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 689–90.
101. See Beers, 927 F.3d at 157–58.
102. Id. at 158 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in
Search of A Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371,
1377–78 (2009)).
103. See id.
104. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Jefferies v. Sessions, 278 F. Supp. 3d 831, 841
(E.D. Pa. 2017)).
105. Id. at 158–59.
106. Mai v. United States (Mai I), 952 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2020).
107. Id. at 1114.
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court declined to decide one way or the other on the issue, however, and assumed
without deciding that the statute burdened his rights.108 Although the court noted
in Mai’s favor that “[t]hose who are no longer mentally ill . . . unquestionably
pose less of a risk of violence” compared to when they were institutionalized,109
it shot down the challenge under intermediate scrutiny because of the
government’s interests in preventing crime and suicide.110
In his dissenting opinion from the denial to rehear the Mai case en banc, Judge
Bumatay took issue with the holding of the case and the application of tiered
scrutiny, penning a strident but well-researched dissent arguing that the text,
history, and tradition of the Second Amendment supported Mai’s contention that
he should be allowed to own a firearm.111 The forcefulness of the dissent makes
it a viable alternative to tiered scrutiny, and yet another potential candidate for
as-applied challenge analyses.
D. TAKING STOCK
It is difficult to explain the three divergent majority opinions. Out of the three
final opinions, Tyler II takes the most plaintiff-friendly friendly approach and
suggests unconstitutional application, Beers expresses hostility towards
restoration of rights for the once involuntarily committed, and Mai I gives
deference to government interests. All three cases use a form of tiered scrutiny
and settle on intermediate scrutiny, but Beers failed to pass step one, Mai failed
to pass step two, and Tyler stated a viable claim under both steps such that it was
necessary to remand. The spectrum of possibilities only increases when
factoring in the cases’ dissents, concurrences, and nonfinal judgements.
The Sixth Circuit in Tyler II came closest to correctly recognizing that the
effective lifetime ban under § 922(g)(4) is an unconstitutional infringement on
the Second Amendment rights of those who have enjoyed years of good mental
health after involuntary commitment. Such a ban fails under the historical
approach advanced by then-Judge Kavanaugh, and it is too broad to survive
tiered scrutiny, as will now be demonstrated in turn.
IV. SECTION 922(G)(4) PROVES UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE
HISTORICAL APPROACH
Judges looking to the text, history, and tradition of the Second Amendment
should strike down these as-applied challenges as unconstitutional. To repeat,
no circuit court has adopted this approach, but it has enjoyed ascendent levels of
approval in dissent such that it may feature in a majority opinion in the future.

108. Id. at 1114–15.
109. Id. at 1121.
110. Id. at 1116.
111. Mai v. United States (Mai II), 974 F.3d 1082, 1085–88 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J.,
dissenting).
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A. HISTORY OF STATUTES BANNING POSSESSION
Put bluntly, laws banning possession by the involuntarily committed do not
enjoy a historical pedigree, with one commentator noting that “[o]ne searches in
vain through eighteenth-century records to find any laws specifically excluding
the mentally ill from firearms ownership.”112 The closest historical support lies
in two state laws from the 1880s, which do not specifically target the mentally
ill but rather ban possession by those of an “unsound mind.”113 Such laws did
not see wider approval until the 1930s when a small number of states adopted
the American Bar Association’s Uniform Firearms Act, which “prohibited
delivery of a pistol to any person of ‘unsound mind.’”114 In addition to a flimsy
pedigree, these statutes may not even serve as proper anologues. As another
scholar has noted, the definition of unsound mind suggests a permanent
condition instead of a temporary one, like mental illness, which can often be
remedied with medical assistance.115
As discussed in Part II, supra, the history of § 922(g)(4) is not longstanding:
Congress passed § 922(g)(4) in the late 1960s, a mere forty years before Heller.
Even then, the ban was not meant to be permanent, as the relief scheme gave
those categorically banned the opportunity to prove their return to mental
sanity.116 Only in 1992 did the ban become effectively permanent, and even then,
the changes to the scheme were intended to keep guns out of the hands of felons,
not the mentally ill.117
B. HISTORICAL ANALOGIES
If no direct historical precedent can be found, judges are next to “reason by
analogy from history and tradition.”118 To be sure, finding a direct analogue for
§ 922(g)(4) is likely fruitless because, as the court in Beers noted, such bans
were historically unnecessary owing to the practice of institutionalization in the
colonial and early periods of America,119 which obviated the need for statutes

112. Larson, supra note 102, at 1376.
113. Mark Frassetto, Firearms and Weapons Legislation up to the Early Twentieth Century
76–77 (Jan. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) , https://ssrn.com/abstract=2200991
[https://perma.cc/K2V3-68WU] (first citing 1881 Fla. Laws 87, chap. 3285, § 1; and then citing
1883 Kan. Sess. Laws 159 § 1).
114. Larson, supra note 102, at 1376–77. Pennsylvania, for example, adopted the uniform
statute in the 1930s. Mai II, 974 F.3d at 1089.
115. Nash E. Gilmore, A Bridge Over Troubled Water: The Second Amendment Guarantee for
the Previously Mentally Institutionalized, 86 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 1, 26 (2017) (citing Unsound Mind,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910)) (noting that the Black’s Law definition of “unsound
mind” refers to “an adult who from infirmity of mind is incapable of managing himself or his
affairs”).
116. See supra Part II.
117. See Gilmore, supra note 115, at 22–23 (discussing what Gilmore calls the accidental
restriction). Gilmore notes that Senate hearings reveal a concern with felon possession. Id. In those
hearings, Senator Simon stated that “[t]he goal of this provision has always been to prohibit
convicted felons from getting their guns back . . . .” Id. at 23 n.119 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. 27,066
(1996)).
118. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
119. Beers v. Att’y Gen. United States, 927 F.3d 150, 157–58 (3d Cir. 2019).
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on societal behavior. In the Enlightenment period, the asylum quickly became
the primary approach to treat the mentally ill.120 As the Beers court noted,
judicial officials in this asylum-based system were free “to ‘lock up’ . . .
individuals with dangerous mental impairments,” such that laws on firearm
possession were unnecessary.121 Institutionalization became “an object of
praise” in the eighteenth century and continued as the dominant remedy for
mental health until the mid-twentieth century, when doctors came to see
medication as the primary means of combatting mental illness.122 In sum, there
simply was no need for statutes on how to deal with the mentally ill at the time
of our nation’s founding until some 200 years had elapsed.
Instead, one must look to historical analogy,123 for which institutionalization
is the proper analogue to modern bans on possession by the mentally ill. In the
period of institutionalization, the loss of rights associated with mental illness
lasted only as long as a person’s commitment. Judge Bumatay notes in his Mai
II dissent that a Lockean understanding of reason and rights can shed light on
the historical relationship between temporary commitment and the
commensurate loss of rights.124 To Locke, rights attach to those who have
attained “reason,” and those rights can be stripped only for the duration that a
person has lost reason.125 The link therein to mental health lies in the fact that
colonial health experts treated mental illness as a temporary loss of reason.126
State laws on the subject are in accord. Early Virginia laws limited rights to
“lunatics” only “during their state of insanity.”127 As one treatise puts it, “a
lunatic [was] never to be looked upon as irrecoverable.”128
Although no direct historical analogue exists, a Lockean understanding of
rights supports the idea that a loss of rights should last no longer than the period
of loss of reason. Using such an approach as our historical analogue in the
absence of similar statutes, then, § 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional.
V. TIERED SCRUTINY
Courts, at least for the foreseeable future, are much more likely to resolve
challenges to § 922(g)(4)’s prohibition on firearm possession by the mentally ill
on the basis of tiered scrutiny. All circuits currently employ some form of

120. MICHELLE O’REILLY & JESSICA NINA LESTER, EXAMINING MENTAL HEALTH THROUGH
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM: THE LANGUAGE OF MENTAL HEALTH 35 (2017).
121. Beers, 927 F.3d at 158 (citing Larson, supra note 102, at 1377–78).
122. O’REILLY & LESTER, supra note 120, at 36–40.
123. See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275.
124. Mai v. United States (Mai II), 974 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J.,
dissenting).
125. Id. (citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1691), reprinted in 4 JOHN
LOCKE, THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 207, 339, 342 (12th ed. 1824)).
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 145 (1803)).
128. Id. (citing ANTHONY HIGHMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IDIOCY AND LUNACY 73
(1807)).
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scrutiny for as-applied Second Amendment challenges to categorical bans, with
the historical approach seeing daylight only in dissent. That being said, history
has a place in the two-step analysis. In the words of the Ninth Circuit, the first
step of the tiered-scrutiny analysis requires courts “to explore the amendment’s
reach based on a historical understanding of the scope of the Second Amendment
right.”129 The second step of the analysis, on the other hand, looks to the
government interests in passing the statutes and the scientific data undergirding
those interests.130
A. GOVERNMENT INTERESTS AT STAKE
As-applied challenges to firearm bans under § 922(g) frequently feature
litigants duking it out over medical studies to bolster, or undercut, alleged
government interests. For § 922(g)(4) specifically, those interests are almost
always prevention of crime and suicide.131 These interests are indisputably
laudable, and few would likely take umbrage at their classification as compelling
or legitimate.132 At the same time, the government must be able to establish a fit
between those objectives and the current lifetime ban on the possession of
firearms under § 922(g)(4)133 without resorting to “mere anecdote and
supposition.”134 This the government cannot do. Studies often prove a higher
short-term propensity for violence or suicide post-release for certain subsets of
the community suffering from mental health conditions.135 But those trends are
simply not borne out in studies of those who have enjoyed decades of good
mental health after involuntary commitment. Upholding § 922(g)(4)’s ban
despite that fact undercuts the Ninth Circuit’s “emphatic[]” rejection of “the
notion that ‘once mentally ill, always so.’”136 In the words of the Tyler II court,
the proffered studies do not justify a lifetime bar to a fundamental right for a
person who was “involuntarily committed many years ago and who ha[s] no
history of intervening mental illness, criminal activity, or substance abuse.”137
The ninetieth Congress would agree, since it never actually intended the GCA
to be a lifetime ban on possession when it passed the Act in 1968.138

129. Mai v. United States (Mai I), 952 F.3d 1106, 1114 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citation
omitted).
130. Id. at 1116–17.
131. See, e.g., id. at 1116; Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler I), 775 F.3d 308, 331
(6th Cir. 2014).
132. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (“There is no doubt that preventing
danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal.”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d
458, 473 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Although the government’s interest need not be ‘compelling’ under
intermediate scrutiny, cases have sometimes described the government’s interest in public safety
in that fashion.”).
133. Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 331.
134. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler II), 837 F.3d 678, 694 (6th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411, 418 (4th Cir. 2012)).
135. Id. at 694–96 (discussing research on formerly involuntarily committed people’s risk for
violence and suicide risk).
136. Mai I, 952 F.3d at 1121.
137. Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 699.
138. See supra Part II.D.
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Crime Prevention

Neither studies on the government interest of crime prevention nor scare
tactics on the dangers posed by the mentally ill warrant a lifetime ban on firearm
possession. Eliciting the names of mass shooters with histories of mental health
problems, as the government did in Tyler I, does nothing to prove why all
persons with past mental health problems deserve a lifetime ban and serves only
to further stigmatize this class of Americans. The government in Tyler I unfairly
drew parallels between the plaintiff and the Virginia Tech shooter, who had a
mental health history that should have disqualified him from being able to pass
a background check.139 In that case, a disconnect between state and federal
reporting systems led to his being able to purchase the firearms that ultimately
killed thirty-two students in 2007.140 This fact may underscore the importance
of effective background check systems, but such an analogy to Tyler amounts to
dishonesty. On the one hand, the Virginia Tech shooter had revered the
Columbine massacre in middle school,141 written violent stories in his college
English classes,142 and grown so hostile in class that his classmates stopped
attending lectures.143 Tyler, by comparison, had a brief depressive episode in
1985 after his “wife of twenty-three years ran away with another man, depleted
[his] finances, and then served him with divorce papers,” and for the next thirty
years he experienced no problems.144
Most medical studies are similarly ill-suited to justify lifetime bans. One
frequently cited scientific study found an increased propensity for reported
assaultive weapon use for 11.1% of former mental health patients compared to
only 2.7% of the never-treated control group.145 Yet when the researchers
adjusted their findings for psychotic symptoms, they found that “much of the
difference between mental patient groups and the never-treated group in rates of
relatively recent violent/illegal behavior can be explained by the level of
psychotic symptoms.”146 In effect, the study only shows that those who have
been committed and who are still exhibiting symptoms of mental health problems
pose an increased risk. At any rate, the category of former patients in the study
is overbroad, including any former patient who has not gone to mental health
counseling in the past year,147 and is subsequently an inapt comparison for those
139. Brief for Federal Appellees at 21–22, Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler I),
775 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1876), 2013 WL 6221194, at *21–22.
140. Id.
141. VA. TECH REV. PANEL, MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH: REPORT OF THE REVIEW
PANEL PRESENTED TO TIMOTHY M. KAINE, GOVERNOR COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 35
(2007), https://scholar.lib.vt.edu/prevail/docs/VTReviewPanelReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/F25GJLCM].
142. Id. at 41–42.
143. Id. at 42–43.
144. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler II), 837 F.3d 678, 683–84 (6th Cir. 2016).
145. Fredrick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have A Right to Bear
Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 15 (2013) (citing Bruce G. Link, Howard Andrews & Francis
T. Cullen, The Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients Reconsidered, 57 AM. SOCIO. REV.
275, 283 tbl.1 (1992)).
146. Link et al., supra note 145, at 288.
147. Id. at 280.
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like Mai that have not needed counseling for decades. An often cited metaanalysis of five studies shows that 0.3% of schizophrenics committed homicide
compared to 0.02% of the general population—a fifteen-fold increase.148 But
schizophrenia is a “lifelong brain disorder,”149 and while the study may weigh
against restoration of Second Amendment rights to schizophrenics, it does little
to prove the same for temporary depressive episodes. When looking to the
broader spectrum of mental health disorders, one study’s “most unexpected
finding” was the sharp decline in violent activity over time.150 In that same study,
when controlling for substance-abuse problems, the researchers found that “the
rates of violent acts perpetrated by involuntarily committed patients and the
general population [of the study’s community were] ‘statistically
indistinguishable.’”151 Not surprisingly, the authors of one law review article
wrote that, collectively, studies that track mental health patients without
substance-abuse disorders “suggest that only the seriously mentally ill or those
with psychosis are more violent.”152
According to the studies, only certain subsections of the community afflicted
by mental health problems pose an increased risk. Those subsets are not
nebulous groupings or ill-defined categories, but rather they are those that suffer
from certain conditions like psychosis or schizophrenia, or suffer from comorbid
addictions like alcohol or drug decencies.153 With a thumbs-up from a physician
confirming a clean bill of mental health, there simply is no scientific basis
linking increased criminality to those like Mai or Tyler.
2.

Suicide Prevention

The government’s interest in preventing self-harm among those with mental
health problems further buttresses Congress’s reasons for § 922(g)(4).154 Like
the prevention of crime, the interest here similarly enjoys Supreme Court
recognition.155 But like the shaky support from criminality studies, the studies
on suicide rates do not justify rigid lifetime bans on constitutional rights. For
example, one government-cited meta-analysis in Tyler II shows a suicide risk
for involuntarily committed patients at “thirty-nine times that expected,” but the

148. Seena Fazel, Gautam Gulati, Louise Linsell, John R. Geddes, & Martin Grann,
Schizophrenia and Violence: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 6 PLOS MED. 1, 7 (Aug. 11,
2009).
149. Schizophrenia, MENTALHEALTH.GOV, https://www.mentalhealth.gov/what-to-lookfor/psychotic-disorders/schizophrenia [https://perma.cc/6NX4-JFCS] (Aug. 23, 2017).
150. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler II), 837 F.3d 678, 696 (6th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Henry J. Steadman, Edward P. Mulvey, John Monahan, Pamela Clark Robbins, Paul S.
Appelbaum, Thomas Grisso, Loren H. Roth & Eric Silver, Violence by People Discharged from
Acute Psychiatric Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393, 400 (1998)).
151. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Steadman et al., supra note 150).
152. Vars & Young, supra note 145, at 17.
153. See Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 696 (citing Steadman et al., supra note 150); Vars & Young,
supra note 145, at 17.
154. See, e.g., Mai v. United States (Mai I), 952 F.3d 1106, 1116 (9th Cir. 2020).
155. Id. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 730–35 (1997) (discussing
physician-assisted suicide)).
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risks were highest following first admissions.156 In fact, suicide risk diminishes
after the beginning of treatment, with “many papers” concurring in that point.157
To be sure, mental health disorders and suicide rates share a disquieting
relationship—at least “[n]inety percent . . . of suicide victims in the United
States suffered from mental illness.”158 The same government-cited metaanalysis study found that suicide risk for individuals with psychiatric diagnoses
was eleven times that of individuals without any diagnosis.159 But again,
unqualified numbers may blur the reality of suicide in communities afflicted by
mental health concerns. In the meta-analysis, the highest incidence of suicide
occurred in the year immediately following consultation and in those with a
history of suicide attempts, suggesting that the rates for people like Mai and
Tyler are, in reality, much lower.160 The high incidence of suicide in the first
year is borne out in a recent meta-analysis that shows drop-offs in suicide rates
postdischarge.161
In sum, studies on crime and suicide within the community of mental health
disorders undoubtedly reveal troubling numbers across the board. But there lies
the rub: across the board studies do not reflect statistics for people who are many
years removed from their involuntary commitment and have suffered no
symptoms since their initial episodes. In litigation, the government has, as of
yet, been unable to prove the contrary. Given the paucity of data to justify the
categorical and rigid lifetime ban on a constitutional right, as-applied challenges
under the right facts prevail under any level of scrutiny.
B. STRICT SCRUTINY
Strict scrutiny is a high standard of review, which Justice Thomas has stated
proves “automatically fatal in almost every case.”162 Laws that involve
fundamental rights in due process claims,163 for example, are examined under

156. E. Clare Harris & Brian Barraclough, Suicide as an Outcome for Mental Disorders, 170
BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 205, 219–20 (1997) (discussing three studies from Northern Europe and one
from America).
157. Id. at 223.
158. Vars & Young, supra note 145, at 21.
159. Harris & Barraclough, supra note 156, at 221 tbl.14h.
160. See id. at 221.
161. See Daniel Thomas Chung, Christopher James Ryan, Dusan Hadzi-Pavlovic, Swaran
Preet Singh, Clive Stanton & Matthew Michael Large, Suicide Rates After Discharge from
Psychiatric Facilities: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 74 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 694, 697–
98 (2017). Across all studies, the suicide rate in the first three months post-discharge was 1,132 per
100,000 person-years. Id. at 697. After ten years, the rates dropped to 277 per 100,000 personyears. Id. First-time admits to psychiatric facilities suffered from lower overall rates of suicide
compared with their multiadmit peers (305 to 517 per 100,000 person-years, respectively), id. at
697–98, which could suggest an even lower incidence of suicide after ten years for those that visited
facilities only once. See id. Though the author readily concedes that the numbers are troubling when
compared to the global suicide rate of only 11.4 per 100,000 person-years, well-funded, statesponsored review panels would likely be able to discern between high- and low-risk applicants
from within the groups that suffer from the lowest rates. Id. at 695.
162. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 316 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
163. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
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strict scrutiny, and they pass muster only if the law is “the least restrictive means
of achieving a compelling state interest.”164 Most circuit courts’ Second
Amendment jurisprudence follows a model in which the decision between strict
and intermediate scrutiny hinges on “the nature of the conduct being regulated
and the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right.”165
The general consensus is that § 922(g)(4) is not subject to strict scrutiny. Only
one court has applied strict scrutiny, but it was vacated in en banc review166—
no court has applied it since. Even so, judges have not shied from advocating its
use in dissenting opinions.167 The argument goes that the statute’s effective
lifetime ban not only strikes at the Second Amendment’s core interest in
protecting the right for “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense
of hearth and home,” but that it guts it.168 What is more is that the statute’s
effective ban targets a narrow class of individuals—the very reason for which
the Court began building its heightened scrutiny jurisprudence in the first
place.169 Finally, judges see strict scrutiny as being in accordance with the high
pedestals on which both Heller and McDonald place the right.170
In the event that a court examines the statute under strict scrutiny, it should
fail because it is not narrowly tailored. As it stands, all formerly involuntarily
committed persons in a majority of states are banned from owning firearms, even
though studies show that not everyone in this group poses increased risks of
suicide or crime. Congress recognized the overinclusivity of this ban when it
passed the original GCA and included a fully funded relief program in order to
separate those that no longer pose risks from those that do. Because Congress’s
restorative outlet to avoid overinclusivity is now available in only a minority of
states, in all other states the ban is overinclusive. NICS data published in 2021
reveals over 6.5 million persons are prohibited from purchasing firearms under
§ 922(g)(4).171 Some portion of that group can certainly petition state restorative
bodies because they live in states with these programs, though the exact number
is unclear because the NICS data is not subdivided by state. Yet data from states
like Massachusetts, for example, illustrate the overinclusivity of the ban. The
Commonwealth of Massachusetts does not receive federal funding to conduct
164. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014).
165. David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits’ Second Amendment
Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193, 276 (2017) (quoting Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller
II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
166. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler I), 775 F.3d 308, 330 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d
en banc, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016).
167. Mai v. United States (Mai II), 974 F.3d 1082, 1092 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J.,
dissenting).
168. Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)).
169. Id. (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
170. The court in Tyler I noted that “the Supreme Court has by now been clear and emphatic
that the ‘right to keep and bear arms’ is a ‘fundamental righ[t] necessary to our system of ordered
liberty.’” Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 326 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778
(2010)). It continued, “In our view, that strong language suggests that restrictions on that right
trigger strict scrutiny.” Id.
171. Active
Records
in
the
NICS
Indices,
FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/filerepository/active_records_in_the_nics-indices.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/6YC2-2M32] (July 31,
2021).
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restorative bodies,172 despite suffering from some of the highest rates of
involuntary commitment from those states studied.173 Without a restorative
body, some 48,000 Massachusettsans lose their Second Amendment rights for
life each year.174 What is more is that the number of Americans who lose their
rights is on the rise. A recent study on rates of involuntary commitment—the
first study of its kind—revealed an uptick in such commitments from 2012
through 2016 of 13.1%.175 With such an increase, more Americans each year
will permanently lose their rights.
C. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
The statute similarly fails under intermediate scrutiny.176 Courts that elect not
to subject § 922(g)(4) to strict scrutiny will likely analyze it under intermediate
scrutiny,177 as it curries favor with the majority of judges in federal circuits when
reviewing Second Amendment challenges.178 Intermediate scrutiny is less
exacting than strict scrutiny, requiring that the government set forth an
“important governmental objective” and that the statute is “substantially related”
to serve that interest.179 Due to its less exacting standard, intermediate scrutiny
provides some wiggle room, and “the government need not prove that there is
‘no burden whatsoever on [the claimant’s] . . . right under the Second
Amendment.’”180
Conceding that crime and suicide prevention constitute important government
interests, the question becomes one of fit. As with the discussion of strict
scrutiny, § 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional because of its overbreadth in classifying
persons no longer exhibiting symptoms of their mental illness with those that are
currently mentally ill, and imposing a lifetime ban on all. To be sure, overbreadth
does not automatically render a statute unconstitutional under intermediate
scrutiny. In fact, the Supreme Court’s formulation of intermediate scrutiny does
not require the fit to be necessarily perfect, but the fit must nonetheless prove

172. NICS Act Record Improvement Program (NARIP) Awards FY 2009-2020, supra note 18.
173. Gi Lee & David Cohen, Incidences of Involuntary Psychiatric Detentions in 25 U.S.
States, 72 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 61, 65 fig.2 (2021).
174. The rate of involuntary commitment in the state is around 700 per 100,000 persons year.
Id. at 65. Census data reflects that the state’s population estimate as of 2019 was 6,892,503 persons.
QuickFacts Massachusetts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/MA
[https://perma.cc/4WWC-AYNZ]. Total population divided by 100,000 multiplied by 700 reveals
that more than 48,000 residents in the state lose their rights each year.
175. Lee & Cohen, supra note 173, at 63.
176. See Keyes v. Sessions, 282 F. Supp. 3d 858, 878 (M.D. Pa. 2017); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler II), 837 F.3d 678, 699 (6th Cir. 2016) (declining to offer a final judgment of
constitutionality, but suggesting that without further studies, § 922(g)(4) would fail intermediate
scrutiny because “[t]here is no indication of the continued risk presented by people who were
involuntarily committed many years ago and who have no history of intervening mental illness,
criminal activity, or substance abuse”).
177. The court in Tyler II, for example, did not consider the applicability of rational basis
review after writing off strict scrutiny. Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 692 (“With strict scrutiny put aside,
there is only one choice left: intermediate scrutiny.”).
178. Ellis, supra note 38, 1343–47 (discussing all circuit courts’ approaches).
179. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
180. Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 693 (citations omitted).

COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2021]

Second-Class Right for Second-Class Citizens

203

substantial.181 Courts analyzing these as-applied challenges recognize that the fit
between the statute and government interests is not substantial: in an as-applied
challenge to § 922(g)(4), one federal district court noted that “[w]e have been
presented with no evidence to indicate that disarming those who went through a
period of mental illness and suicide attempts over a decade ago . . . reasonably
fits within the governmental interest.”182
D. EXTRA-JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS
Although the statute fails as it is applied to the formerly involuntarily
committed under tiered scrutiny and the historical approach, relying on plaintiffs
to bring as-applied challenges that will likely be appealed is a short-term fix that
fails to correct the root of the problem. Only those that have the time and money
to bring suit against the government can realistically bring these challenges that
may go through years of litigation and rounds of appellate review.183 Even for
those that have the resources, potential challengers may be disincentivized to
disclose their history of mental illness in court.
A better solution lies in refunding the federal relief-from-disabilities program
that the GCA created in 1968. Such a system would foster uniformity and ensure
that citizens of all states have a route to restore their Second Amendment rights.
Alternatively, Congress could retool the current state incentive program to
encourage more than just twenty-two states to participate.184 As other
commentators have noted, the federal relief program “cost[s] the government
$3,700 to process each application, which is a small amount of money . . . when
weighed against protecting an individual’s right guaranteed to him by the
Constitution.”185
E.

ENDING THE STIGMA

As a matter of policy, ending the effective lifetime ban may go hand-in-hand
with reducing the stigma of mental illness. The stigma of mental illness both
“denigrates the value of people who have a mental illness” and “creates
inequities in funding and service delivery that undermine recovery and full
social participation.”186 Studies on the topic link mental-illness stigma to a
perception that those who are afflicted are “dangerous, unpredictable, different,
and to be blamed for their condition.”187 Those that suffer feel the
181. See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(quoting Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
182. Keyes v. Sessions, 282 F. Supp. 3d 858, 878 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
183. Tyler’s challenge, for example, was heard on January 29, 2013. Tyler v. Holder, No. 1:12CV-523, 2013 WL 356851 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013). Not until three and a half years later did
the Sixth Circuit hear the case en banc. Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 678. Even then, the court remanded
the case. Id. at 699.
184. See supra Part II.D.
185. Gilmore, supra note 115, at 38.
186. Julio Arboleda-Flórez & Heather Stuart, From Sin to Science: Fighting the Stigmatization
of Mental Illnesses, 57 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 457, 457 (2012).
187. Julie Chronister, Chih-Chin Chou & Hsin-Ya Liao, The Role of Stigma Coping and Social
Support in Mediating the Effect of Societal Stigma on Internalized Stigma, Mental Health Recovery,
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disapprobation: public disapproval can be associated with “lower self-esteem,
depression, feeling misunderstood and ashamed, poor medication adherence,
fewer successful social interactions, reduced help seeking, worse recovery,
lower quality of life (QOL), fewer job opportunities, inadequate health coverage,
and fewer leased apartments.”188
In the wake of highly publicized shootings in the 2010s—Sandy Hook
Elementary; Aurora, Colorado; and the Arizona attack that left six dead and U.S.
Representative Gabrielle Gifford injured—pro-Second Amendment lobbying
groups turned to the mentally ill as a scapegoat.189 The National Rifle
Association’s Wayne LaPierre, in discussing a national database of the mentally
ill, spoke about the existence of “genuine monsters [who are] so deranged, so
evil, so possessed by voices and driven by demons, that no sane person can
ever[] possibly comprehend them.”190 Efforts to curb violence are laudable, but
such rhetoric does nothing but sensationalize the overstated link between mental
illness and violence.191
But societal distrust of the mentally ill can be mitigated through legislative
reforms that improve protections for this class.192 In addition to righting a
constitutionally impermissible wrong, requiring states to conduct holistic
examinations of applicants seeking to regain their Second Amendment rights
would reduce the feelings of being devalued, dismissed, and dehumanized by a
system that codifies sentiments expressed by Wayne LaPierre. Repealing a law
that casts all of those once adjudicated to be mentally ill into one category and
replacing it with a system that looks at each person as an individual restores a
sense of belonging and fitting with society.193 Psychiatric studies concur: lower
rates of self-stigma (the internalization of society’s negative stereotypes)
correlates to improved outcomes down the road.194
VI. CONCLUSION
When Congress defunded the federal restorative program in 1992,195 it
and Quality of Life Among People with Serious Mental Illness, 41 J. CMTY. PSYCH. 582, 583
(2013).
188. Id.
189. Debra A. Pinals, Firearms and Mental Illness: Preventing Fear and Stigma from
Overtaking Reason and Rationality, 40 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 379, 381–82
(2014).
190. Id. at 382–83 (quoting Wayne La Pierre, Remarks from the NRA Press Conference on
Sandy Hook School Shooting, Delivered on Dec. 21, 2012 (Transcript), WASH. POST. (Dec. 21,
2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/remarks-from-the-nra-press-conference-onsandy-hook-school-shooting-delivered-on-dec-21-2012-transcript/2012/12/21/bd1841fe-4b8811e2-a6a6-aabac85e8036_story.html [https://perma.cc/L2NB-ALDM].
191. See supra Part V.A; Pinals, supra note 189, at 385–87.
192. See Arboleda-Flórez & Stuart, supra note 186, at 462.
193. See Janice Connell, Alicia O’Cathain & John Brazier, Measuring Quality of Life in Mental
Health: Are We Asking the Right Questions?, 120 SOC. SCI. & MED. 12, 15 (2014).
194. Nathalie Oexle, Mario Müller, Wolfram Kawohl, Ziyan Xu, Sandra Viering, Christine
Wyss, Stefan Vetter & Nicolas Rüsch, Self-Stigma as a Barrier to Recover: A Longitudinal Study,
268 EUR. ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 209, 209–11 (2018).
195. See Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L.
No. 102–393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1732.
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effectively created a lifetime ban on firearm possession by those that have, at
some point in their lives, been involuntarily committed to a mental health
institution. Such a ban upholds the misguided notion that “once mentally ill,
always so”196—a notion that is belied by studies on the governmental interests
at stake.
Second Amendment jurisprudence stands on uncertain grounds in recent
years given the unpredictability of judicial analysis. Justice Scalia’s
pronouncement on the presumptive validity of statutes like § 922(g)(4) only
serves to muddy waters. Simply put, the statute does not enjoy the historical
pedigree that Heller assumed, and scientific studies call into question whether
the statute serves the asserted government interests of suicide and crime
prevention at all. Though it is perhaps high time that the Supreme Court takes
up another Second Amendment case to pass judgment on the correct analysis of
the right, courts in the immediate future should find that the statute offends a
“fundamental right necessary to our system of ordered liberty”197 under either a
historical or tiered-scrutiny analysis. Alternatively, Congress should retool the
current restorative body framework to ensure that Americans in all states have
access to some form of redress.
People like Mai and Tyler who have enjoyed many years of clean mental
health since an involuntary commitment deserve to have their rights restored.
The Second Amendment is not a second-class right, and formerly committed
Americans are not second-class citizens—finding § 922(g)(4) unconstitutional
would put into practice these two common-sense ideals.

196. Mai v. United States (Mai I), 952 F.3d 1106, 1121 (9th Cir. 2020).
197. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler I), 775 F.3d 308, 326 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010)).

